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INTRODUCTION
Every day, thousands of Americans receive summonses to serve
on civil juries in state and federal courts.1 These summonses present
a remarkable invitation to participate in the exercise of government
power. If selected for service, these Americans will adjudicate
factual disputes among fellow citizens. In so doing, they will
perform a function of long historical pedigree as part of a political
institution that protects our liberty, and in Alexis de Tocqueville’s
words, they will exercise “one mode of popular sovereignty.”2
The civil jury is a structural element of our government and is
best understood in the context of our larger constitutional system.
As a general matter, the seven articles of the Constitution establish
the structure of government,3 and the Bill of Rights protects
individual rights.4 There are exceptions to this general rule.
Elements of the original Constitution protect individual rights5 and
provisions in the Bill of Rights perform structural functions.6 Other
provisions both serve a structural function and protect individual
rights.7 The Fourth Amendment, for example, interweaves the
substance of the right against unreasonable searches and seizures
with a structural provision that requires the executive branch to
secure search warrants from the federal courts.8
The Seventh Amendment likewise serves a structural purpose
and protects individual rights. It preserves the individual right to
trial by jury in suits “at common law,” accompanied by a structural
allocation of the authority to decide facts without reexamination.9
1. E.g., 2012 Jury Administration Statistics, ST. CONN. JUD. BRANCH, www.jud.ct.gov/
statistics/jury/Jury_12.pdf (last visited Jan. 29, 2014).
2. 1 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 311 (Arthur Goldhammer trans.,
Penguin Putnam Inc. 2004) (1838).
3. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 (establishing the legislative branch of government).
4. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. I (protecting free speech and other rights). 
5. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2 (preserving access to the writ of habeas corpus).
6. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. X (reserving to the states and to the people powers “not
delegated to the United States by the Constitution”).
7. See, e.g., J. Harvie Wilkinson III, Our Structural Constitution, 104 COLUM. L. REV.
1687, 1687 (2004) (“[T]he supposed dichotomy between rights and structure is never so stark
as some would have it.”).
8. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
9. U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
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This allocation of authority to the civil jury confers its political
importance. Colonial Americans understood that “[e]very new
tribunal erected for the decision of facts, without the intervention of
a jury ... is a step towards establishing aristocracy, the most
oppressive of absolute governments.”10 The Founders intended the
civil jury to serve as an institutional check on that power by giving
ordinary American people direct control over one element of
government.11 
This Article will proceed in four parts. First, it will demonstrate
the historical understanding of the civil jury as a political institu-
tion, from the pre-revolutionary period, through the drafting and
ratification of the Constitution and Bill of Rights, and beyond.
Second, it will describe the recent corporate attacks on the civil jury
and how a series of Supreme Court decisions have prioritized
corporate interests over the protection of the civil jury. Third, it will
explain the importance of continuing to protect the civil jury as a
political institution within our system of government. Finally, it will
propose some practical steps for achieving this goal.
I. THE HISTORY OF THE CIVIL JURY AS AN ELEMENT OF THE
STRUCTURE OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT
A. Early English History
Elements of the jury system appeared in England in the twelfth
century when “Henry II introduced the principle that instead of the
judicial combat [the tenant] might put himself upon the grand
assize, a forerunner of jury trial.”12 By the fifteenth century, civil
juries of independent persons heard witness testimony brought by
opposing counsels.13 This now-familiar system “avoid[ed] the
10. 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *380. 
11. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 437 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834) (statement of James Madison).
12. JOHN H. LANGBEIN ET AL., HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW: THE DEVELOPMENT OF
ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL INSTITUTIONS 100 (2009) (alteration in original) (quoting F.W.
MAITLAND, THE FORMS OF ACTION AT COMMON LAW 22 (A.H. Chaytor & W. Whittaker eds.,
1909)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
13. See id. at 245 (describing “a civil jury trial in which jurors ignorant of the events learn
about the facts from witness testimony”).
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doubtful outcome of battle,”14 in part because unbiased jurors were
able to judge the reliability of witnesses brought before them.15 
To English legal scholars, such as Sir William Blackstone, the
“trial by jury” was the “glory of the English Law.”16 Blackstone
urged his readers to “guard with the most jealous circumspection
against the introduction of new and arbitrary methods of trial,
which, under a variety of plausible pretenses, may in time impercep-
tibly undermine this best preservative of English liberty.”17 He
explained, in words that should ring true still today: 
[T]he most powerful individual in the state will be cautious of
committing any flagrant invasion of another’s right, when he
knows that the fact of his oppression must be examined and
decided by twelve indifferent men, not appointed till the hour of
trial; and that, when once the fact is ascertained, the law must
of course redress it. This therefore preserves in the hands of the
people that share which they ought to have in the administra-
tion of public justice, and prevents the encroachments of the
more powerful and wealthy citizens.18
A few elements of this analysis bear emphasis. First, Blackstone
focuses on the relative power of the injured party and the injuring
party and stresses the jury’s political function as a venue in which
all citizens stand equal before the law.19 Second, Blackstone reminds
his reader that the power exercised by the jury properly belongs to
the people as a whole, not to a wealthy few, and that the jury is thus
a fundamentally democratic institution.20 Third, Blackstone’s
comments are directed at the jury’s resolution of disputes between
14. Id. at 100 (quoting THE TREATISE ON THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF THE REALM OF
ENGLAND COMMONLY CALLED GLANVILL 28 (G.D.G. Hall ed. & trans., 1965)).
15. Sir Fortescue explained that jurors were “sound in repute and fair-minded, not
brought into court by either party, but chosen by a respectable and impartial officer .... The[y]
know all that the witnesses admit in their depositions, and they know the reliability,
unreliability, and repute of the witnesses brought forward.... Truly, nothing is omitted that
can discover the truth of the question in dispute.” Id. at 244 (quoting JOHN FORTESCUE, ON
THE LAWS AND GOVERNANCE OF ENGLAND 38-40 (Shelley Lockwood ed., Cambridge Univ. Press
1997) (1470)).
16. BLACKSTONE, supra note 10, at *379-81.
17. Id. at *381.
18. Id. at *380.
19. See id.
20. See id.
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individuals: in other words, civil suits.21 Fourth, Blackstone implies
that the power of the jury depends on the inability of powerful
individuals to tamper with it, stressing that the jurors are “indiffer-
ent men” who are insulated from interference in that they are “not
appointed till the hour of trial.”22 Finally, unlike many constitu-
tional provisions designed to protect the individual against abuse of
the power of government, the civil jury defends the individual
against “the more powerful and wealthy citizens.”23 
B. Pre-Revolutionary American History
America’s earliest settlers established trial by jury in the new
colonies. As Stephan Landsman has documented: 
The 1606 charter given by James I to the Virginia Company has
been read as incorporating the right to jury trial. By 1624 juries
were available for all civil and criminal cases in Virginia. The
Massachusetts Bay Colony followed a similar pattern by
introducing jury trials in 1628 and codifying jury procedure in
the Massachusetts Body of Liberties in 1641. The Colony of West
New Jersey followed suit in 1677, as did Pennsylvania under
William Penn’s proprietorship in 1682. Eventually, all the
colonies embraced trial by jury.24 
These juries served a political function by ensuring local community
control over criminal sanctions and the redress of grievances.25 As
Akhil Amar has noted, few colonists ever had the opportunity to
vote for the imperial officers who held governing authority, whether




24. Stephan Landsman, The Civil Jury in America: Scenes from an Underappreciated
History, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 579, 592 (1993) (footnotes omitted) (citing Harold M. Hyman &
Catherine M. Tarrant, Aspects of American Trial Jury History, in THE JURY SYSTEM IN
AMERICA 24-25 (Rita J. Simon ed., 1975); MASSACHUSETTS BODY OF LIBERTIES para. 29 (1641),
reprinted in SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES 151 (Richard L. Perry & John C. Cooper eds., 1952)).
25. See generally John C.P. Goldberg, The Constitutional Status of Tort Law: Due Process
and the Right to a Law for the Redress of Wrongs, 115 YALE L.J. 524 (2005) (examining the
constitutional significance of the law of redress). 
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of Trade, Parliament, colonial governors, [or] colonial judiciaries.”26
In contrast, “ordinary colonists could and did vote for colonial
assemblies and vote in colonial juries.”27 This “best preservative of
English liberty”28 sank deep roots into American soil.
By the late eighteenth century, Americans used their civil jury
powers “to assail imperial policies and shield patriot practices,”
including by finding against the British in customs cases.29 This
drove British authorities to “divert as much judicial business as
possible away from American juries.”30 Such denials of jury access
“featur[ed] prominently in formal colonial complaints in the 1760s
and 1770s.”31 When Parliament passed the Stamp Act, which sought
to collect numerous duties from the colonies, it also restricted jury
access by authorizing enforcement “in any Court of Record, or in any
Court of Admiralty ... or in any Court of Vice Admiralty ... at the
Election of the Informer or Prosecutor.”32 Colonists in the Stamp Act
Congress of 1765 responded by declaring that “trial by jury is the
inherent and invaluable right of every British subject in these
colonies.”33 Similar protests were made throughout the mid-1770s
even after the Stamp Act was repealed. “[T]he oppressive behavior
of British authorities in enforcing the so-called Intolerable Acts and
similar measures” was answered by colonial congresses that
“trumpeted the right to trial by jury in both civil and criminal cases
and excoriated royal administrators for tampering with that right.”34
Colonial complaints about deprivation of access to the jury moved
the colonies toward revolution. The Second Continental Congress,
for example, complained that colonists were deprived “of the
accustomed and inestimable privilege of trial by jury, in cases
affecting both life and property.”35 Fundamentally, the colonists
26. AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION 233 (2005). 
27. Id.
28. BLACKSTONE, supra note 10, at *381.
29. AMAR, supra note 26, at 233.
30. Id. 
31. Landsman, supra note 24, at 595.
32. Stamp Act, 1765, 5 Geo. 3, c. 12, § 57 (Eng.).
33. Landsman, supra note 24, at 595 (quoting RESOLUTIONS OF THE STAMP ACT CONGRESS
1765, para. 7, reproduced in SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES, supra note 24, at 270).
34. Id. at 595-96.
35. DECLARATION OF THE CAUSES AND NECESSITY OF TAKING UP ARMS (1775), reprinted in
SELECT CHARTERS AND OTHER DOCUMENTS ILLUSTRATIVE OF AMERICAN HISTORY 1606-1775,
at 374, 376 (William MacDonald ed., 1906).
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complained about their lack of self-government: “But why should we
enumerate our injuries in detail?” they asked, because “[b]y one
statute it is declared, that parliament can of right make laws to bind
us in all cases whatsoever.”36 But the focus on the jury was intense.
The Virginia Declaration of Rights, for example, demanded: “That
in controversies respecting property, and in suits between man and
man, the ancient trial by jury is preferable to any other and ought
to be held sacred.”37 The Declaration of Independence itself listed
“depriving [the colonists] in many Cases, of the Benefits of Trial by
Jury” as one way in which the “present King” had “combined with
others to subject [the colonists] to a jurisdiction foreign to our
Constitution, and unacknowledged by our Laws; giving his Assent
to their Acts of pretended Legislation.”38 As Blackstone explained,
the civil jury “preserves in the hands of the people that share which
they ought to have in the administration of public justice.”39 The
colonists would not yield this share of power. 
C. The Constitution and Bill of Rights
When the new states drafted their constitutions after
independence, they enshrined the civil jury. The Pennsylvania
Constitution of 1776 provided: “Trials shall be by jury as heretofore:
And it is recommended to the legislature of this state, to provide by
law against every corruption or partiality in the choice, return, or
appointment of juries.”40 The New Jersey Constitution of 1776
provided that “the inestimable right of trial by jury shall remain
confirmed as a part of the law of this Colony, without repeal,
forever.”41 The Georgia Constitution of 1777 preserved the role of
civil juries, even granting them the authority to be “judges of law,
as well as of fact,” and allowing appeal of a jury verdict only to
36. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
37. VA. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS § 11 (1776), available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/
18th_century/virginia.asp.
38. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE paras. 15, 20 (U.S. 1776).
39. BLACKSTONE, supra note 10, at *380.
40. PA. CONST. of 1776, § 25, as reprinted in 5 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION 353 (Philip
B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 2000).
41. N.J. CONST. of 1776, art. XXII, as reprinted in THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION, supra
note 40, at 353.
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another “special jury.”42 New York, Vermont, Maryland,
Massachusetts, Delaware, North Carolina, and South Carolina’s
constitutions all protected the civil jury.43
The Articles of Confederation did not mention the civil jury, but
the civil jury figured prominently during consideration of the
proposed Constitution. Although the Constitution guarantees that
“Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment[,] shall be by
Jury,”44 the proposed Constitution did not make reference to the
civil jury. This omission “triggered a firestorm of protest” from anti-
federalists who feared the consolidation of political power by the
federal government.45 The “Federal Farmer,” for example, empha-
sized the advantages of the civil jury as a political institution and its
democratizing effect:
The trial by jury is very important in another point of view. It is
essential in every free country, that common people should have
a part and share of influence, in the judicial as well as in the
legislative department.... The few, the well born, etc. as Mr.
Adams calls them, in judicial decisions as well as in legislation,
are generally disposed, and very naturally too, to favour those of
their own description.46
 
The Federal Farmer inquired in a later letter “why not use the
language that has always been used in this country, and say, the
people of the United States shall always be entitled to the trial by
42. GA. CONST. of 1777, art. XLI, XLIII, as reprinted in THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION,
supra note 40, at 353. My home state of Rhode Island was governed by its original Royal
Charter from 1663 until 1843. The 1843 Constitution includes a right to civil jury trial that
has been preserved since adoption. PATRICK T. CONLEY & ROBERT G. FLANDERS, JR., THE
RHODE ISLAND STATE CONSTITUTION: A REFERENCE GUIDE 90 (2007).
43. See DEL. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS § 13 (1776); MASS. CONST. of 1780, art. XV; MD.
DECLARATION OF RIGHTS art. III (1776); N.Y. CONST. of 1777, art. XLI; N.C. CONST. of 1776,
art. XIV; S.C. CONST. of 1776, art. XVIII; VT. CONST. of 1777, ch. 1, art. XIII. 
44. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
45. Landsman, supra note 24, at 598 (“The omission of the civil jury triggered a firestorm
of protest. In response, the Federalists sought to assuage worries about the right to civil jury
trial.”); see also id. at 600 (“It was critical to the Antifederalists that the jury serve the
interests of democracy by injecting the values of the many into judicial proceedings.”) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
46. Letter from the Federal Farmer, No. 4 (Oct. 12, 1787), as reprinted in THE FOUNDERS’
CONSTITUTION, supra note 40, at 354. 
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jury.”47 The Federal Farmer believed “the people still hold the right
sacred” and that “the jury trial is a solid uniform feature in a free
government.”48 “A Democratic Federalist” added that the proposed
constitution “effectually abolished” the right to civil trial by jury.49
He cited the example of a citizen injured by a federal officer and
asked what “satisfaction [could be] expect[ed] from a lordly court of
justice, always ready to protect the officers of government against
the weak and helpless citizen?”50 He saw no shelter in such a forum
from the “iron hand of arbitrary power” and urged his fellow citizens
to “never consent to part with the glorious privilege of trial by jury,
but with your lives.”51
Federalists who responded to these criticisms were quick to
concede the importance of the civil jury. James Wilson, speaking at
the Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention, recognized the “excellences”
of the civil jury52 and reported that the members of the
Constitutional Convention had not intended to abridge the right to
a jury in civil cases.53 Wilson argued that the number of differing
forms of trial by jury in the states made inclusion of a civil jury
provision in the Constitution impractical and that leaving the
precise form of the federal civil jury to Congress’s determination was
the wisest approach.54 
James Iredell, or “Marcus,” explained similarly that, in light of
the existence of Courts of Chancery and Admiralty and other courts
47. Letter from the Federal Farmer, No. 16 (Jan. 20, 1788), as reprinted in THE FOUNDERS’
CONSTITUTION, supra note 40, at 358 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
48. Id.; see also id. (“The trial by jury in criminal as well as in civil causes, has long been
considered as one of our fundamental rights, and has been repeatedly recognized and
confirmed by most of the state conventions.”).
49. Letter from A Democratic Federalist (Oct. 17, 1787), as reprinted in THE FOUNDERS’
CONSTITUTION, supra note 40, at 355.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. 2 ELLIOT’S DEBATES 488-89 (1787), as reprinted in THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION,
supra note 40, at 355-56 (statement of James Wilson) (“I think I am not now to learn the
advantages of a trial by jury. It has excellences that entitle it to a superiority over any other
mode, in cases to which it is applicable.”). 
53. Id. at 489 (“It is a charge, sir, not only unwarrantable, but cruel: the idea of such a
thing, I believe, never entered into the mind of a single member of that Convention.”).
54. Id. (“The legislature shall establish it by proper regulations! So, after all, the
gentleman has landed us at the very point from which we set out. He wishes them to do the
very thing they have done—to leave it to the discretion of Congress. The fact, sir, is, nothing
more could be done.”).
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that do not use juries, “[a] general declaration therefore to preserve
the trial by jury in all civil cases would only have produced confu-
sion.”55 He believed that the Constitution could not have spoken to
the subject without “entering into a detail highly unsuitable to a
fundamental constitution of government.”56 Iredell saw no risk to
the civil jury because it was “so justly a favorite of the whole people”
and elected representatives would “have no interest in making
themselves odious, for the mere pleasure of being hated.”57 He
believed that restricting access to the civil jury “would undoubtedly
produce an insurrection ... that would hurl every tyrant to the
ground who attempted to destroy that great and just favorite of the
English nation.”58
Alexander Hamilton likewise reassured in Federalist No. 83 that
Americans had nothing to worry from the Constitution’s silence
regarding the civil jury.59 Though he admitted his own doubts that
access to a civil jury was essential to liberty and wondered about
better systems for adjudicating property suits,60 Hamilton explained
that it was practical challenges that prevented its inclusion in the
Constitution: “For my own part, at every new view I take of the
subject, I become more convinced of the reality of the obstacles
which, we are authoritatively informed, prevented the insertion of
a provision on this head.”61
Hamilton’s view did not prevail. By August 1788, “five of the
thirteen ratifying conventions had already made clear, in a series of
formal declarations, that Americans wanted more jury safeguards
55. James Iredell, Marcus, Answers to Mr. Mason’s Objections to the New Constitution
(1788), reprinted in THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION, supra note 40, at 357.
56. Id. 
57. Id.
58. Id. He continued: “We certainly shall be always sure of this guard at least upon any
such act of folly or insanity in our representatives. They soon would be taught the
consequence of sporting with the feelings of a free people.” Id. at 357-58.
59. THE FEDERALIST No. 83, at 419 (Alexander Hamilton) (Ian Shapiro ed., Yale Univ.
Press 2009).
60. Thomas Jefferson did not share these doubts. He wrote to Thomas Paine, for example,
in the summer of 1789 stressing: “I consider [trial by jury] as the only anchor ever yet
imagined by man, by which a government can be held to the principles of its constitution.”
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Thomas Paine (July 11, 1789), reprinted in 7 THE WRITINGS
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 408 (Andrew A. Lipscomb & Albert E. Beigh eds., 1903); see also Letter
from Thomas Jefferson to the Abbé Arnoux (July 19, 1789), reprinted in THE FOUNDERS’
CONSTITUTION, supra note 40, at 363.
61. THE FEDERALIST No. 83, supra note 59, at 423.
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than Article III offered.”62 Soon Congress sent the provisions now
known as the Bill of Rights to the states for ratification.63 Among
these was the Seventh Amendment, which provides: “In Suits at
common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty
dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried
by a jury, shall be otherwise reexamined in any Court of the United
States, than according to the rules of common law.”64
Even James Madison, who once did not see the need for a Bill of
Rights, supported the Amendment, stating that “[t]rial by jury ... is
as essential to secure the liberty of the people as any one of the pre-
existent rights of nature.”65 The Amendment was ratified effective
December 15, 1791, with the rest of the Bill of Rights.66 The anchor
was set by which the government would be held to the principles of
the new Constitution. 
A few elements of the Amendment bear particular note. First, it
“preserved” the right to the civil jury.67 The civil jury was a preexist-
ing institution of government with which all citizens were familiar
and whose significance was well appreciated in the pre-revolution-
ary period.68 Second, the Seventh Amendment identifies fact-finding
as the core function and province of the jury.69 Blackstone had said,
“[W]hen once the fact is ascertained, the law must of course redress
it.”70 The jury, not the judge, holds this core power of ascertainment
under the Seventh Amendment.71 Third, the Amendment does not
focus on specifics such as how many jurors are required.72 Instead,
62. AMAR, supra note 26, at 236; see also Landsman, supra note 24, at 600.
63. There is limited legislative history for the Seventh Amendment. See Edith Guild
Henderson, The Background of the Seventh Amendment, 80 HARV. L. REV. 289, 292 (1966)
(“Thus the only evidence we have shows—not really to anyone’s surprise—that the Bill of
Rights was adopted to reassure the minority who felt that the Constitution in its unamended
form did not sufficiently safeguard their liberties.”).
64. U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
65. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 437 (1789) (Joseph Lales ed., 1834) (statement of James Madison);
see Paul Finkelman, James Madison and the Bill of Rights, 1990 SUP. CT. REV. 301, 309-13
(noting that James Madison did not support a declaration of rights during the Constitutional
Convention).
66. ROBERT AUEN RUTLAND, THE BIRTH OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS 1776-1791, at 217 (1955).
67. U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
68. See Landsman, supra note 24, at 592.
69. U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
70. BLACKSTONE, supra note 10, at *380.
71. See U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
72. See id.
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the Amendment positions the civil jury, however its details are
worked out, as an important element of American government.73 
D. Post-Ratification and Reconstruction History 
Reverence for the civil jury continued after ratification of the
Seventh Amendment. Joseph Story, who served on the Supreme
Court of the United States from 1811 to 1845, wrote that the
Seventh Amendment is “most important and valuable” and “places
upon the high ground of constitutional right the inestimable
privilege of a trial by jury in civil cases, a privilege scarcely inferior
to that in criminal cases, which is conceded by all to be essential to
political and civil liberty.”74 This view also continued to be held at
the state level, including in my home state of Rhode Island, which
had used juries since 1743.75 Previously governed by the Royal
Charter that had been issued in 1663, Rhode Island adopted its first
constitution in 1843.76 That constitution protected the civil jury with
a provision that has been preserved ever since. 
Reconstruction renewed the emphasis on the civil jury. Political
leaders understood jury service as a political right like voting, and
the civil jury as a political institution.77 Senator William P.
Fessenden, chair of the Joint Committee on Reconstruction, for
example, explained that “a voter is an officer, not in the same
degree, perhaps, but as much so in substance as the man who enters
the jury box, as any one who holds an office.”78 Congress likewise
73. This should have satisfied the Federal Farmer who wrote: “[T]he jury trial is a solid
uniform feature in a free government; it is the substance we would save, not the little articles
of form.” Letter from the Federal Farmer, No. 16 (Jan. 20, 1788), reprinted in 2 THE
COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 327 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981).
74. JOSEPH STORY, 2 COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 574
(The Lawbook Exch., Ltd. 2001) (3d ed. 1858).
75. See Olney v. Arnold, 3 U.S. 308, 313 n.* (1796) (“[B]oth the Grand and Petty Jury in
the several counties, shall give their attendance at said court, on the second day of the court’s
sitting, by nine of the clock in the forenoon: and in case of none appearance of a sufficient
number, such juries shall be filled up de talibus circumstantibus, as at the inferior Courts of
Common Pleas and General Sessions of the Peace, by the Sheriff or his deputy.”); Taylor v.
Place, 4 R.I. 324, 352 n.1 (1856) (describing act of 1743, including jury right upon appeal). 
76. CONLEY & FLANDERS, supra note 42, at 21.
77. See AMAR, supra note 26, at 612 n.106; Vikram David Amar, Jury Service as Political
Participation Akin to Voting, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 203 (1995).
78. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 704 (1866). This view of the comparability of
voting in elections and in the jury box was subsequently echoed in Justice Harlan’s dissent
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recognized that the jury would not serve its intended political
function if discrimination were allowed in jury selection.79 To that
end, the Civil Rights Act of 1875 required that “no citizen possessing
all other qualifications which are or may be prescribed by law shall
be disqualified for service as grand or petit juror in any court of the
United States, or of any State, on account of race, color, or previous
condition of servitude.”80 Though later striking down other provi-
sions, the Supreme Court upheld the provision of the Civil Rights
Act of 1875 that authorized criminal prosecution for discrimination
in jury service.81
II. THE UNDERMINING OF THE CIVIL JURY’S STRUCTURAL ROLE IN
AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND THE BENEFITS TO CORPORATIONS
The civil jury’s role as a political institution that enables direct
citizen engagement in government has made it a natural target of
the most powerful elements of our society. Created as a check on the
oppressions of “the most powerful individuals in the state,”82 the
civil jury will inevitably cause frustration to the powerful. Curbing
“invasion of another’s right” by the powerful is its very function.83
Perhaps unsurprisingly then, in the last forty years as corporations
have more and more become “the most powerful individuals in the
state,”84 the civil justice system as a whole, and the civil jury
particularly, have been the targets of a sustained attack by
corporations. The immediate corporate wish is to reduce liability
exposure. More broadly, big corporations do not want to be
in Plessy v. Ferguson in which he noted the absurdity of subjecting citizens who were
permitted to vote and to participate in a jury to segregation. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S.
537, 561-62 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
79. See, e.g., Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 345 (1879).
80. See Civil Rights Act of 1875, 18 Stat. 335, 336, invalidated by Civil Rights Cases, 109
U.S. 3, 25 (1883).
81. See Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 25; Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. at 348-49. In fact,
the dissent’s argument rested on the basis that jury service was considered an important
political function, arguing that the Fourteenth Amendment protects only “civil rights.” The
dissent believed that the Amendment did not protect “political rights” such as “holding office
and discharging a public trust” and jury service, the subject of that case. Id. at 368 (Field, J.,
dissenting).
82. BLACKSTONE, supra note 10, at *380.
83. Id.
84. Id.
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answerable to institutions of government they can only influence
through argument and on terms of equality.85 This corporate
campaign has been waged in state legislatures, Congress, judicial
elections, and litigation. Too frequently, this campaign has
succeeded, leaving Americans without redress and eroding the civil
jury as a core component of our system of government.
A. Corporate Victories in the Courts 
Two months before his nomination to the Supreme Court, Lewis
Powell, Jr. wrote a memorandum at the request of the Chamber of
Commerce laying out “possible avenues of action” to aid American
big business.86 His recommendations ranged from enhancing
corporate “public relations” departments to promoting pro-corporate
faculty and textbooks in schools.87 The strategy’s centerpiece was a
new focus on government: “Business must learn the lesson,” Powell
instructed, “that political power is necessary.”88 This included
exploiting a “[n]eglected [o]pportunity in the [c]ourts.”89 “Under our
constitutional system,” he argued, “especially with an activist-
minded Supreme Court, the judiciary may be the most important
instrument for social, economic and political change.”90 
Powell called on the Chamber of Commerce to assemble “a highly
competent staff of lawyers” and hire “lawyers of national standing
and reputation” to file amicus briefs in the Supreme Court.91 Powell
had in mind a sophisticated strategy of “impact” litigation to change
the law.92 In keeping with this direction, the Chamber launched its
85. The extent of corporate influence on the executive and legislative branches through
campaign contributions, relentless lobbying, and now unlimited election spending is verging
on a national scandal. Seeking such influence with a jury—to “tamper” with it—is a crime.
Thus corporate America prefers to have its important issues adjudicated in the legislative and
executive branches.
86. Memorandum from Lewis F. Powell, Jr. to Eugene Sydnor, Chairman, Education
Committee, U.S. Chamber of Commerce 1 (Aug. 23, 1971) (on file with the Washington &
Lee’s Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Archives), available at http://law.wlu.edu/powellarchives/page.asp?
3pageid=1251.
87. Id. at 10-11, 15-16, 19.
88. Id. at 25-26.
89. Id. at 26.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 27.
92. Id.
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“Institute for Legal Reform” in 1988, which describes itself as a
“national legal reform advocate ... working to change the laws, [and]
also changing the legal climate.”93 
One focus of the ensuing corporate legal campaign has been to
make the civil justice system more favorable to corporations.94 The
campaign has achieved major victories since Chief Justice John
Roberts’ investiture in 2005. From early 2006 through June 2010,
the Chamber of Commerce prevailed in forty-one of the sixty cases
in which it filed an amicus brief—a winning rate of 68 percent.95 On
average, the five conservative Justices voted for the Chamber’s
position 74 percent of the time.96 Many victories were significant. In
the Ledbetter case, the Court overturned a verdict in an employment
discrimination case, concluding that an employer could not be held
liable if it successfully hid the discriminatory treatment from the
victim long enough.97 In the Leegin case, the Court reversed
precedent that prohibited vertical price restraints.98 In the Janus
case, the Court limited the ability of mutual fund investors to
recover for securities fraud, holding that fund advisors cannot be
found liable for knowingly including misstatements of others in the
documents they prepare.99 And in the Gross case, the Court
93. About, INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/about (last
visited Jan. 29, 2014).
94. This legal campaign has been supported in numerous ways, including media efforts,
see, e.g., About Us, FACES OF LAWSUIT ABUSE, http://www.facesoflawsuitabuse.org/about/ (last
visited Jan. 29, 2014), professional development organizations such as the Federalist Society,
see, e.g., STEVEN M. TELES, THE RISE OF THE CONSERVATIVE LEGAL MOVEMENT 135-37 (2008),
and lobbying efforts in state legislatures by organizations such as the American Legislative
Exchange Council, see, e.g., Mike McIntire, Conservative Nonprofit Acts as a Stealth Business
Lobbyist, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 21, 2012, at A1. 
95. CONSTITUTIONAL ACCOUNTABILITY CTR., THE ROBERTS COURT AND CORPORATIONS: THE
NUMBERS TELL THE STORY, 1 (June 2010), available at http://theusconstitution.org/think-
tank/issue-brief/robert-court-and-corporations-numbers-tell-story.
96. Id.
97. Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618, 632 (2007) (holding that an
employee’s discrimination claim was untimely when not brought within 180 days after the
alleged intentional discrimination, even when the employee could not have known the
discriminatory act occurred until years later).
98. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 907 (2007) (replacing
the per se rule against vertical price restraints under § 1 of the Sherman Act with a looser
“rule of reason” standard), overruling Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S.
373 (1911).
99. Janus Capital Group, Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296, 2302 (2011)
(holding that only a “person or entity with ultimate authority over the statement, including
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overturned a jury decision in favor of a victim of age discrimina-
tion.100 Each of these cases was decided by a 5-4 margin, with the
five Republican appointees voting as a bloc in support of the
corporate position.101 
Citizens United, another 5-4 decision, marked the crowning
victory for corporations and opened the floodgates for unlimited,
anonymous corporate cash in our elections, causing awful effects
that we saw in the most recent election cycle.102 As I explained in an
amicus brief I submitted with Senator John McCain in a subsequent
case, Citizens United grants corporations new power over our
government not just through the corrupting ability to buy elections
for favored candidates, but also through the corrupting but less
visible ability to threaten officeholders with a barrage of negative
attack ads if they fail to cast a pro-corporate vote.103 Such a
dominant role for corporations in our government would shock our
Founding Fathers, who foresaw no important role in our republic for
the corporations of the time, let alone today’s massive agglomera-
tions of corporate wealth.104
its content and whether and how to communicate it” can be held liable for false statements
under SEC Rule 10b-5). 
100. Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc, 557 U.S. 167, 177-78 (2009) (holding that a plaintiff
must prove “that age was the ‘but-for’ cause of the challenged employer decision” under the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, which prohibits discrimination against any
employee “because of” that individual’s age).
101. See supra notes 97-100 and accompanying text.
102. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 372 (2010); see also, Spencer
MacColl, A Center for Responsive Politics Analysis of the Effects of: Citizens United v. Federal
Election Commission, OPEN SECRETS BLOG (May 5, 2011, 11:16 AM) http://www.opensecrets.
org/news/2011/05/citizens-united-decision-profoundly-affects-political-landscape.html (noting
that “social welfare” groups organized under § 501(c)(4) of the tax code and who do not disclose
their donors spent $134 million in political advocacy).
103. Brief of United States Senators Sheldon Whitehouse & John McCain as Amici Curiae
Supporting Respondents, Am. Tradition P’ship, Inc. v. Bullock, 132 S. Ct. 2490 (2012) (No. 11-
1179).
104. The Federalist Papers, for example, include no such arguments, and both Jefferson
and Madison subsequently made clear their concerns about corporate wealth. See Letter from
Thomas Jefferson to George Logan (Nov. 12, 1816), reprinted in 12 THE WORKS OF THOMAS
JEFFERSON 44 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1905) (“I hope we shall take warning from the
example and crush in its birth the aristocracy of our monied corporations which dare already
to challenge our government to a trial of strength and bid defiance to the laws of our
country.”); Letter from James Madison to J.K. Paulding (March 10, 1827), reprinted in 9 THE
WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 281 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1910) (“Incorporated companies, with
proper limitations and guards, may, in particular cases, be useful; but they are at best a
necessary evil only.”).
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B. Corporate Victories and the Undermining of the Civil Jury
Right
Corporate victories at the Supreme Court have undermined the
civil jury and whittled down the political function that it plays in
our society. Such victories have allowed corporations to steer
plaintiffs out of civil courtrooms and into arbitration; to more
readily fend off plaintiffs via pleading rules; to evade exposure to
class actions; and to ask friendly judges to reduce the jury’s
assessment of punitive damages. All of these decisions, although
pushed by many so-called “originalist” Justices, overlook the
original understanding and purposes of the civil jury right.105
C. Arbitration and Privatized Justice
Congress enacted the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) in 1925 to
guide federal courts applying commercial arbitration agreements.106
For many years, the Supreme Court applied the statute narrowly.107
This began to change in the 1980s and 1990s,108 and in 2001, the
Court effectively broadened the FAA by adopting a constrictive
interpretation of the exemption from the FAA of employees engaged
in “interstate commerce.”109 More recently, the Court has gone
further. In Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson, the Court held that
Americans cannot go before a court to challenge an unconscionable
105. Originalism is generally understood to inquire into the original intent or original
meaning of the legal text at issue and often relies on dictionaries and other authoritative
contemporaneous sources. See generally ORIGINALISM (Steven G. Calabresi ed., 2007). An
originalist approach to the Seventh Amendment should thus give careful study to the fact that
the Amendment “preserves” a preexisting right that Americans understood at the time of the
founding to be a bulwark against tyranny and a form of popular government. 
106. See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 23-30 (1983) (O’Connor, J., dissenting)
(describing the history of the FAA).
107. Joshua R. Welsh, Comment, Has Expansion of the Federal Arbitration Act Gone Too
Far?, 86 MARQ. L. REV. 581, 587-91 (2002) (discussing court cases limiting the applicability
of the FAA).
108. See, e.g., Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos., Inc. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 274-77 (1995)
(holding that the FAA was intended to cover the full scope of activity covered by the
Commerce Clause); Southland Corp., 465 U.S. at 15-16 (holding that the FAA applies in state
as well as federal court).
109. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 119 (2001).
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arbitration agreement.110 Instead, questions about the unfairness of
an arbitration agreement must be put to the arbitrator whose
authority the injured party disputes.111 Moreover, since the Court’s
decision in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, mandatory arbitra-
tion clauses can deprive consumers of access to class action
litigation.112 That case considered a California law that had been
interpreted by California courts to prohibit waiving access to a class
action in an arbitration agreement.113 The Court held that state law
to be preempted by the FAA, leaving harmed plaintiffs with no
alternative but to pursue individual arbitration claims.114 In
practice, this gave corporations license to pursue the low-dollar,
high-volume frauds that are customary targets of class actions. 
Taken together, this case law has established a presumption in
favor of arbitration that tips the balance the wrong way.115 Studies
have found that top arbitrators ruled for businesses against
consumers up to 93.8 percent of the time in some contexts.116 Often,
defendants benefit from hidden evidence, secret proceedings, limited
or no review, and prohibitive costs for injured parties. With the jury
removed from the picture (as the Federal Farmer warned), there is
no longer a role in these cases for American citizens to apply and
uphold our laws, protect the rights of individuals, and hold the
powerful accountable.117
110. 130 S. Ct. 2772, 2778-79 (2010).
111. Id.
112. 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1750-51 (2011).
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. See Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1983)
(“The Arbitration Act establishes that, as a matter of federal law, any doubts concerning the
scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration.”). 
116. JOHN O’DONNELL, PUBLIC CITIZEN, THE ARBITRATION TRAP: HOW CREDIT CARD
COMPANIES ENSNARE CONSUMERS 15 (2007), available at http://www.citizen.org/documents
/ArbitrationTrap.pdf; Associated Press, Firm Agrees to End Role in Arbitrating Credit Card
Debt, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 19, 2009, at B8 (describing settlement of a suit filed by the Minnesota
Attorney General that saw the National Arbitration Forum cease arbitrating consumer credit
card disputes after being accused of “violating state consumer fraud, deceptive trade practices
and false advertising laws by hiding financial ties to collection agencies and credit card
companies”). 
117. See supra text accompanying note 46.
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D. Pleading Decisions and Lost Access to the Facts
A second set of decisions has altered pleading standards, creating
new barriers to block cases from getting to a civil jury. The Supreme
Court had construed the governing Federal Rule of Civil Procedure,
Rule 8(a), in Conley v. Gibson: 
In appraising the sufficiency of the complaint we follow, of
course, the accepted rule that a complaint should not be dis-
missed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond
doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his
claim which would entitle him to relief.118
 
“[B]eyond doubt”; “no set of facts”119—a tough standard and one
consistent with respect for the civil jury right. If there were no
material facts in dispute after discovery, the case could be resolved
by summary judgment; but if there were facts to uncover or facts in
dispute, the case would proceed to a jury, which would perform its
historic role of ascertaining the facts.120 As Justice Stevens ex-
plained, “Under the relaxed pleading standards of the Federal
Rules, the idea was not to keep litigants out of court but rather to
keep them in.”121
The Roberts Court’s decisions in Twombly and Iqbal overturned
the notice pleading standard. The Court ruled that a complaint
must “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”122 Such a
claim, the Court ruled, must “plead[ ] factual content that allows the
court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged.”123 The Court’s pleading standard “asks
for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted
unlawfully”; it is no longer enough if “a complaint pleads facts that
are ‘merely consistent with’ a defendant’s liability.”124 The Court’s
new “plausibility” standard, whereby a judge—not the jury—screens
a complaint to make his own assessment of the facts and inferences,
118. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957).
119. Id.
120. See BLACKSTONE, supra note 10, at *380.
121. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 575 (2007) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
122. Id. at 570.
123. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
124. Id. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).
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makes it harder for plaintiffs to reach discovery and ultimately
present their case to a jury. The result, according to one recent
study, is that plaintiffs have seen their cases dismissed more
frequently.125 This trend benefits corporate defendants. But it marks
a blow against the civil jury system itself. 
E. Class Actions and Economic Barriers to Justice
Roberts Court decisions have also restricted access to class action
litigation. The class action vehicle allows individuals with common
claims to seek adjudication of their complaints in a single case.126 A
class action can also benefit defendants by binding all of the parties
in a single ruling. Despite these advantages, however, corporations
have long lobbied against class actions. In 2011, the Court restricted
employees’ rights to participate in class action law suits for
discrimination.127 It did so through a novel interpretation of a
preliminary requirement for class actions: that there be questions
of law or fact common to the class.128 The district court had identi-
fied a series of common facts related to the company’s pay and
promotion policies, which tied together the class.129 But the
conservative majority instead focused on differences between class
members and made its own judgment of whether the common issues
predominated.130 The Dukes decision makes it more difficult for
individual citizens who have been injured to join together, bring a
case before a jury, and hold corporate wrongdoers accountable.131
125. Jonah B. Gelbach, Note, Locking the Doors to Discovery? Assessing the Effects of
Twombly and Iqbal on Access to Discovery, 121 YALE L.J. 2270, 2273, 2277-78 (2012)
(analyzing cases that faced motions to dismiss post-Iqbal and suggesting the shift in
standards “negatively affected a sizeable share of those plaintiffs”).
126. The class action can overcome “the problem that small recoveries do not provide the
incentive for any individual to bring a solo action prosecuting his or her rights.” Amchem
Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 617 (1997) (quoting Mace v. Van Ru Credit Corp., 109
F.3d 338, 344 (7th Cir. 1997)). “[The] class action solves this problem by aggregating the
relatively paltry potential recoveries into something worth someone’s (usually an attorney’s)
labor.” Id. (quoting Mace, 109 F.3d at 344).
127. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2250-52, 2257-58 (2011).
128. Id. at 2550-52.
129. Id. at 2549 & n.3.
130. Id. at 2555-56; see also id. at 2566 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
131. See, e.g., Scott A. Moss & Nantiya Ruan, The Second-Class Class Action: How Courts
Thwart Wage Rights by Misapplying Class Action Rules, 61 AM. U. L. REV. 523, 528 (2012)
(“[T]he heightened Rule 23 ‘commonality’ requirement in Wal-Mart Stores has the potential
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This hurdle to jury access relates to the Court’s decision in
Concepcion, discussed above, which preferred individual arbitration
to class action litigation.132 Powerful corporations now have a clear
playbook to evade the civil jury when they have caused a large
group of people relatively small individual injuries.133 If a contract
forces mandatory arbitration and prohibits class actions, individual
plaintiffs will lack the resources or incentives to bring claims.
Large-scale, small-denomination frauds will lie beyond the reach of
the civil jury.134
F. Damage Caps and Juries’ Lost Discretion
American civil juries traditionally were afforded broad discretion
to determine the appropriate damages in a case; it was one of their
“peculiar function[s].”135 In the 1990s, however, the Supreme Court
began to constitutionalize this issue—not to protect the constitu-
to largely limit employment class actions.”); Nina Totenberg, Top Court Rules in Favor of Wal-
Mart, NAT'L PUB. RADIO (June 20, 2011, 3:00 PM), http://www.npr.org/2011/06/20/137304956/
top-court-rules-in-favor-of-wal-mart (citing civil rights attorney David Sanford as declaring,
“This is a disaster not only for civil rights litigants but for anyone who wants to bring a class
action”); see also Jason M. Solomon, The Political Puzzle of the Civil Jury, 61 EMORY L.J. 1331,
1334 (2012) (indicating that the Wal-Mart decision was animated, in part, by a desire to
restrain the role of civil juries).
132. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1758-60 (2011) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
133. Myriam Gilles & Gary Friedman, After Class: Aggregate Litigation in the Wake of
AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 623, 627 (2012).
134. Id. at 627 (warning that as a result of the Roberts Court’s class action decisions, most
companies “may simply opt out of potential liability by incorporating class action waiver
language in their standard form contracts with consumers (or employees or others)”). One
recent decision, Amgen, Inc. v. Connecticut Retirement Plans & Trust Funds, departs from the
Roberts Court’s trend of limiting class actions, holding 6-3 that a class need not prove the
materiality of misrepresentation at the class certification stage. 133 S. Ct. 1184, 1197 (2013).
The Amgen case appears to be an aberration, however, as it was followed by another 5-4
decision that treated a class action with hostility. See Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct.
1426, 1452 (2013) (holding that a class of cable subscribers was improperly certified because
the circuit court had declined to look beyond the pleadings and consider whether the putative
class could prove class-wide damages).
135. See, e.g., Barry v. Edmunds, 116 U.S. 550, 565 (1886) (“For nothing is better settled
than that, in such cases as the present, and other actions for torts where no precise rule of law
fixes the recoverable damages, it is the peculiar function of the jury to determine the amount
by their verdict.”); Mo. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Humes, 115 U.S. 512, 521 (1885) (“The discretion of the
jury in such cases is not controlled by any very definite rules; yet the wisdom of allowing such
additional damages to be given is attested by the long continuance of the practice.”).
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tional role of the civil jury, but rather to limit it in order to benefit
corporate defendants in the name of the Due Process Clause.136
Decisions imposing substantive due process review of damage
awards prompted objections even from conservatives. Justice Scalia
wrote in one case, “The jury in this case was instructed on the
purposes of punitive damages under West Virginia law, and its
award was reviewed for reasonableness by the trial court and the
West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals. Traditional American
practice governing the imposition of punitive damages requires no
more.”137 Even if they concluded that some due process limits should
apply, other Justices recognized the historic and constitutional role
of the jury. Justice O’Connor dissented:
Our system of justice entrusts jurors—ordinary citizens who
need not have any training in the law—with profoundly impor-
tant determinations. Jurors decide not only civil matters, where
the financial consequences may be great, but also criminal cases,
where the liberty or perhaps life of the defendant hangs in the
balance. Our abiding faith in the jury system is founded on
longstanding tradition reflected in constitutional text, and is
supported by sound considerations of justice and democratic
theory. The jury system long has been a guarantor of fairness,
a bulwark against tyranny, and a source of civic values.138
In 2008, however, the Court departed from the constitutional role
of the jury in deciding damages awards.139 In Exxon Shipping, a case
arising from a catastrophic oil spill, the Supreme Court ultimately
136. See, e.g., State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 416-18, 425, 429
(2003); BMW of N. Am. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 585-86 (1996); TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res.
Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 465-66 (1993); Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 15-19 (1991). 
137. TXO Prod. Corp., 509 U.S. at 470 (Scalia, J., concurring).
138. Id. at 473 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted). Justice O’Connor
went on to explain her belief in constitutional damages limits: 
Arbitrariness, caprice, passion, bias, and even malice can replace reasoned
judgment and law as the basis for jury decisionmaking. Modern judicial systems
therefore incorporate safeguards against such influences. Rules of evidence limit
what the parties may present to the jury. Careful instructions direct the jury’s
deliberations. Trial judges diligently supervise proceedings, watchful for
potential sources of error. And courts of appeals stand ready to overturn
judgments when efforts to ensure fairness have failed.
Id. at 474 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
139. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471 (2008).
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reduced a jury’s award of $5 billion in punitive dam-
ages—equivalent to just one year of Exxon’s profits at that
time140—by 90 percent.141 Although the case went through federal
court and considered questions of federal law, in this case, maritime
law,142 the Justices paid no heed to the constitutional role of the civil
jury. The Court reasoned that any punitive damages greater than
the compensatory damage award would make the damages too
unpredictable.143 The judgment of the jury, and the wisdom of the
Founding Fathers, was for the Court a lesser value than providing
modern corporations “predictability.” 
In these various ways, the Court increasingly has become the
handmaiden and body servant to the powerful, with particular ardor
when that power is amassed in corporate form. In its ardency, the
Court has repeatedly trampled over the original role, powers, and
traditions of the civil jury.
III. THE CONTINUING IMPORTANCE OF THE CIVIL JURY AS A
POLITICAL INSTITUTION
The cases discussed above preferred corporate interests to the
rights of everyday Americans and undermined the institution of the
civil jury. As a result, we are changing from a society in which all
parties must stand equal before a jury to one in which injured
parties must seek relief directly from the corporations who injured
them or through corporate-funded dispute resolution systems.
Indeed, some scholars have questioned the value of the civil jury,
140. See Exxon, Chevron Profits Surge; Gulf Crisis Cited, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 25, 1991),
http://articles.latimes.com/1991-01-25/business/fi-738_1_gulfcrisis (reporting Exxon’s net
income in 1990 as $5.01 billion).
141. Exxon Shipping, 554 U.S. at 476, 481, 515. The Court of Appeals initially reduced the
jury’s punitive damages award from $5 billion to $2.5 billion. Id. at 481. The Supreme Court
held that only a maximum of $507.5 million in punitive damages could be awarded. Id. at 515.
142. Id. at 475-76 (discussing the federal maritime nature of the case).
143. Id. at 502 (“Our review of punitive damages today, then, considers not their
intersection with the Constitution, but the desirability of regulating them as a common law
remedy for which responsibility lies with this Court as a source of judge-made law in the
absence of statute. Whatever may be the constitutional significance of the unpredictability
of high punitive awards, this feature of happenstance is in tension with the function of the
awards as punitive, just because of the implication of unfairness that an eccentrically high
punitive verdict carries in a system whose commonly held notion of law rests on a sense of
fairness in dealing with one another.”).
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and others have suggested that preserving Americans’ right to
redress in court is most important, rather than any particular
mechanism for gaining that redress.144 The number of jury trials has
plunged precipitously, with below 2 percent of federal civil cases and
below 1 percent of state civil cases reaching a jury.145 This is not
simply because cases settle before they go to trial; of all the cases
that reach trial in state court civil actions, 96 percent are resolved
in bench trials.146 Apparently parties, like some commentators, do
not believe that juries are likely to adjudicate their cases better
than a judge presiding over a bench trial.147 These are not views that
Alexis de Tocqueville could have foreseen when he argued that the
jury is “first and foremost a political institution, and must always
be judged as such.”148 These statistics instead beg the question
whether the contemporary civil jury should still be understood as an
important element of our system of government and as a “guarantor
of fairness, a bulwark against tyranny, and a source of civic
values.”149
This Part will argue that the civil jury should continue to exercise
a structural role in government beyond fact-finding in particular
cases. The civil jury should remain a bulwark against the oppres-
sions of power. In addition, the civil jury can prevent judicial
autocracy and guide judges in the exercise of their authority in
bench trials. Finally, the jury continues to be a forum in which
Americans exercise a measure of popular sovereignty over their
society, fostering civil engagement, education, and deliberation.
144. See, e.g., Warren E. Burger, Thinking the Unthinkable, 31 LOY. L. REV. 205, 210-13
(1985) (arguing that citizens that make up juries are not well suited to handle the complex
and lengthy trials that are now common); John H. Langbein, The Disappearance of Civil Trial
in the United States, 122 YALE L.J. 522, 551-53 (2012) (arguing that an increase in pretrial
discovery has eliminated the need for a fact-finding jury).
145. Langbein, supra note 144, at 524.
146. Solomon, supra note 131, at 1374 (citing Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenburg,
Trial by Jury or Judge Transcending Empiricism, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1124, 1127 n.7. (1992)).
147. Id. at 1333-34.
148. DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 2, at 313; see also id. (“To regard the jury simply as a
judicial institution would be to take a notably narrow view, for if the jury has a great
influence on the outcome of a trial, it has an even greater influence on the fate of society
itself.”).
149. TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 473-74 (1993).
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A. The Prevention of Judicial Autocracy
The civil jury prevents judicial autocracy in two important ways.
First, by removing fact determination from the province of the
judge, the civil jury eliminates any bias that may be introduced
through the judge’s preferences. Blackstone observed, for example:
[Judges are] generally selected by the prince or such as enjoy the
highest offices in the state, [and] their decisions, in spite of their
own natural integrity, will have frequently an involuntary bias
towards those of their own rank and dignity: it is not to be
expected from human nature, that the few should be always
attentive to the interests and good of the many.150
 
The modern practice of appointment by the chief executive, or of
popular election using campaign contributions, does little to reduce
this risk of “involuntary bias.”151
Alexander Hamilton likewise viewed the civil jury as “a security
against corruption.”152 He reasoned: “As there is always more time
and better opportunity to tamper with a standing body of magis-
trates than with a jury summoned for the occasion, there is room to
suppose that a corrupt influence would more easily find its way to
the former than the latter.”153 
Concerns over corrupt influence may not be relevant as often in
our contemporary civil justice system,154 but as judicial appointment
becomes more politicized, and as special interest funding becomes
more influential in judicial elections, corruption, particularly in the
sense meant by the Founders, is a consideration not to be over-
looked. At a minimum, the availability of civil jury trials ensures
150. BLACKSTONE, supra note 10, at *379.
151. See infra notes 152-55 and accompanying text.
152. THE FEDERALIST NO. 83, supra note 59, at 422.
153. Id.
154. But see Caperton v. A. T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 872-74 (2004) (holding that
due process was violated when a West Virginia State Court of Appeals judge refused to recuse
himself in a case with a defendant who had contributed $3 million for the election of the judge
just months before the company appealed); Stratos Pahis, Corruption in Our Courts: What It
Looks Like and Where It Is Hidden, 118 YALE L.J. 1900, 1918 (2009) (identifying thirty-eight
incidences between 1967 and 2000 of judges being convicted or removed from office for
accepting bribes).
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that parties are not forced to suffer the biases that might develop
among judges.155 
There is some evidence, albeit contested, that civil juries view
certain matters differently than judges. One scholar identified a
distinction between judges and juries in patent suits;156 another
found differing treatment of corporate defendants;157 and others
determined that juries in personal injury cases generally award
higher compensatory and punitive damages than judges.158 Even if
these distinctions may be overstated, juries may inform how judges
resolve cases in civil bench trials with respect to both the determi-
nation of liability and the scope of damages. There is a widespread
perception, for example, that juries are particularly likely to hold
corporations accountable (to be, in corporate lingo, “anti-
business”).159 That alone may, subtly, make judges more wary of
letting particular defendants off the hook in bench trials. And with
respect to a judge setting damages in civil cases, the level of
compensatory and punitive damages in comparable cases tried
before a jury will almost certainly be a relevant and informative
factor.160 
B. The Sovereignty of the People
“The jury system as it is understood in America,” de Tocqueville
wrote, “seems to me a consequence of the dogma of popular sover-
eignty just as direct and just as extreme as universal suffrage. Both
155. See supra notes 150-54 and accompanying text.
156. See Kimberly A. Moore, Populism and Patents, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 69, 76, 81-82 (2007).
157. See Ann M. Scarlett, Shareholders in the Jury Box: A Populist Check Against
Corporate Mismanagement, 78 U. CIN. L. REV. 127, 158, 172-73 (2009) (“[J]uries tend to award
larger damages against corporate defendants than individual defendants.”).
158. See Joni Hersch & W. Kip Viscusi, Punitive Damages: How Judges and Juries Perform,
33 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 2-3 (2004); Harry Kalven, Jr., The Dignity of the Civil Jury, 50 VA. L.
REV. 1055, 1065 (1964) (finding that, on average, juries’ damage awards were 20 percent
higher than judges reported they would have awarded).
159. See Valerie P. Hans, The Illusions and Realities of Jurors’ Treatment of Corporate
Defendants, 48 DEPAUL L. REV. 327, 328 (1998) (“Contemporary assessments of the jury’s
predispositions toward business corporations in the courtroom continue to reflect the view
that juries are anti-business.”).
160. See, e.g., Thomas v. iStar Fin., Inc., 508 F. Supp. 2d 252, 255, 263 (S.D.N.Y. 2007)
(“Most significantly, the jury’s award is not in line with the punitive damages awarded in
similar cases by this Court or other courts in this Circuit.”).
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are equally powerful means of ensuring that the majority reigns.”161
This remains true to this day. Juries infuse community values into
the adjudication of civil suits and ensure that judgments are based
on the principles of a representative selection of the parties’ peers.162
They also allow Americans to participate in self-government.163
Juries need not achieve a better result than judges for popular
sovereignty to have value.164 Nor does the sovereign function of civil
juries lie only in their power to ignore or otherwise nullify unjust or
unreasonable laws (although on occasion, civil juries have done just
that).165 Rather, the civil jury’s elevation of the sovereignty of the
people is important for at least two major reasons.
First, service on civil juries fosters civic education and citizen
engagement in our government. As de Tocqueville wrote:
The jury is incredibly useful in shaping the people’s judgement
and augmenting their natural enlightenment. This, in my view,
is its greatest advantage. It should be seen as a free school, and
one that is always open, to which each juror comes to learn
about his rights.... I think that the primary reason for the
practical intelligence and political good sense of Americans is
their long experience in civil matters.
I do not know if juries are useful to civil litigants, but I do know
that they are very useful to people who judge them. I see the
161. DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 2, at 314; see also id. at 315 (“The jury is above all a
political institution. It should be regarded as a form of popular sovereignty. If popular
sovereignty is repudiated, the jury should be discarded entirely; otherwise it should be seen
in relation to other laws establishing popular sovereignty.”).
162. See Steven Hetcher, The Jury’s Out: Social Norms’ Misunderstood Role in Negligence
Law, 91 GEO. L.J. 633, 646-47 (2003) (arguing that juries “draw from their diverse array of
everyday norms and customs ... to render a decision”). The infusion of community values into
jury decision making is not simply a contemporary observation; it is also an ideal we aspire
to in our political system. See, e.g., Solomon, supra note 131, at 1376 (noting the political ideal
that juries create communal norms). 
163. See infra notes 166-67 and accompanying text.
164. For example, a jury acquitted four police officers who were charged with, and caught
on video tape, assaulting Rodney King. See Richard A. Serrano, All 4 Acquitted in King
Beating, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 30, 1992), http://articles.latimes.com/1992-04-30/news/mn-
1942_1_ventura-county-jury.
165. See, e.g., Lars Noah, Civil Jury Nullification, 86 IOWA L. REV. 1601, 1628 (2001)
(arguing that civil jury nullification was present and accepted as part of the American judicial
system in the late eighteenth century).
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jury as one of the most effective means available to society for
educating people.166
This holds true today. No juror can sit through a trial, evaluating
witnesses, listening to instructions from the bench, and grappling
with pieces of evidence without learning about our laws and our
legal institutions. I can personally attest to this phenomenon, both
with grand and petit jurors.
Jurors form a political decision-making body. Along with voting
and service in the military167 or as a government employee, partici-
pation in a jury offers citizens a direct path to serve our republic.
Jury service, in fact, may be the most democratic means through
which ordinary citizens can participate in government at the federal
level. Voters can choose their representatives, and members of the
military and public servants can help defend our country or
implement our laws. But in jury service, the people themselves are
empowered to make decisions on the outcome of disputes and the
application of laws in our communities. Judges frequently report on
the seriousness with which jurors engage in these responsibilities
and the sense of engagement with which it invests them.168 And,
“[b]y forcing men to be concerned with affairs other than their own,
[trial by jury] combats individual egoism which is to societies what
rust is to metal.”169
Jury service allows citizens to reflect on their broader civic role
and obligations. This form of civic engagement proves to be satisfy-
ing for most jurors. Recent research indicates that those who serve
on juries typically report a far more satisfying experience with the
legal system than those who were summoned for duty but never
166. DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 2, at 316.
167. David Williams, Civic Republicanism and the Citizen Militia: The Terrifying Second
Amendment, 101 YALE L.J. 551 (1991).
168. See, e.g., Allen Pusey, Judges Rule in Favor of Juries, DALL. MORNING NEWS (May 7,
2000), 2008 WLNR 9445148 (reporting on a survey of judges that showed 98 percent of judges
find that juries do at least “moderately well,” with more than 60 percent saying that “they
would rather have their own civil case heard by a jury than a judge or an arbitrator”).
169. DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 2, at 316.
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empanelled.170 Some recent research further indicates that jury
service makes citizens more likely to vote.171 
Because the jury is a deliberative body, it requires citizens to
interact with, debate, and listen to each other to arrive at a shared
decision.172 We do not simply conclude a case, instruct the jury, take
a poll, and allow the majority to prevail. Instead, jurors discuss the
evidence and the law with each other in order to agree on an
outcome. Scholars and judges have noted that this deliberation
produces better results.173 In addition, jury service brings together
people from different walks of life, locks them in a room with each
other, and requires them to deliberate together. That can only
strengthen, bit by bit, the fabric of our democracy.174 In de
Tocqueville’s words, the jury was “the most effective means
available to society for educating the people.”175
Second, the civil jury has political value simply because it helps
distribute government power. The American system of government
is built on Montesquieu’s and Locke’s premise that divided
government and separated powers are most protective of individual
liberty.176 In our system of interlocking checks and balances, the
170. Julianna C. Chomos et al., Increasing Juror Satisfaction: A Call to Action for Judges
and Researchers, 59 DRAKE L. REV. 707, 709-10 (2011).
171. JOHN GASTIL ET AL., THE JURY AND DEMOCRACY: HOW JURY DELIBERATION PROMOTES
CIVIC ENGAGEMENT AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION 26-51 (Oxford University Press 2010); see
also John Gastil & Phillip J. Weiser, Jury Service as an Invitation to Citizenship: Assessing
the Civic Value of Institutionalized Deliberation, 34 POL’Y STUD. J. 605, 609, 614-15 (2006)
(finding that satisfying jurors’ expectations for jury service yields changes in selected civic and
political behaviors).
172. Leah Sprain & John Gastil, What Does It Mean to Deliberate? An Interpretative
Account of Jurors’ Expressed Deliberative Rules and Premises, 61 COMM. Q. 151, 154-55 (2013)
(evaluating how jurors conceptualize and experience deliberation).
173. See, e.g., JAMES S. FISHKIN, DEMOCRACY AND DELIBERATION 1-2, 29 (1991) (arguing
that democracy is best served through a deliberative process that can inform participants);
see also Pusey, supra note 168 (quoting a federal judge in praise of a jury that “[i]t’s more than
the wisdom of one person times twelve. One juror hears something differently from the other.
They begin to rethink the way they’ve seen things.”).
174. As Akhil Amar has explained, “Through the jury, citizens would learn self-government
by doing self-government.” Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE
L.J. 1131, 1187 (1991); see also GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC
1776-1787, at 606, 608 (1969) (discussing the importance to the proper function of the
American constitutional system that the Founders placed on a virtuous and engaged
citizenry).
175. DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 2, at 285.
176. See BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS 151-52 (Thomas Nugent trans.,
Hafner Publ’g Co. 1949) (1777) (“When the legislative and executive powers are united in the
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civil jury plays a minor but vital role. The civil jury further
distributes the divided authority of the state and vests citizens with
direct and substantial authority with respect to one of the state’s
functions: adjudicating disputes both among citizens and between
citizens and government officials. By separating this power, the
American system of government makes it more difficult for those
with power to gain control over all the levers of power in society or,
less dire but perhaps more significant, for those with undue
influence in society to abuse that influence.177 By diversifying the
form and function of different elements of government, the
Founding Fathers ensured that all of government could not be
readily broken or captured, even if one branch or another were
somehow compromised.178 
It is in this context that the jury achieves its crowning role. The
slow and persistent encroachments of power reach readily into most
organs of government—a truth as old as government. The media can
align with that power, echoing its narrative and approving its
encroachments. The legislative and executive branches are most
susceptible to the encroachments of the powerful, but even judges
are not immune. Judges can have, as Blackstone noted, “an
involuntary bias towards those of their own rank and dignity.”179
Against this constant tide of power and influence stands the jury, an
eight hundred year old institution designed to be separate from the
prevailing structure of power.180 When you are alone, and the forces
of society are arrayed against you; when lobbyists have the legisla-
ture tied in knots and the governor in their pocket; when the owners
of the local paper have marshaled public opinion against you; then,
one last sanctuary remains: the hard square corners of the jury box
stand firm against the tide of influence and money.
same person, or in the same body of magistrates, there can be no liberty .... [T]here is no
liberty, if the judiciary power be not separated from the legislative and executive.”). Locke
similarly argued for a separation of powers noting that “the legislative and executive power
are in distinct hands ... in all moderated monarchies and well-framed governments.” JOHN
LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 203 (Thomas I. Cook ed., Hafner Publ’g Co. 1965)
(1690).
177. WOOD, supra note 174, at 606, 608.
178. Id.
179. BLACKSTONE, supra note 10, at *379.
180. See LANGBEIN ET AL., supra note 12, at 100.
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The reduced number of civil jury trials does not entirely undercut
the value of the civil jury as a mechanism for distributing and
separating power. A check on power or tyranny need not be used
frequently for it to have value. Other constitutional provisions such
as those providing for the impeachment of federal judges181 or the
presidential veto182 check abuse, even if they are infrequently used.
A holstered weapon can have effect, but that weapon still has to be
available. America should never let down its guard against the
encroachment of the powerful, nor remove the safety valves that our
Founding Fathers built into our system of government. The premise
of the American system of government is that the most powerful in
our society will seek to gain control over all exercises of government
power. The principles of separation of powers and government by
the people, including the civil jury, are our established guardians
against such encroachment. We allow them to wither at our peril.
IV. RESTORING THE CIVIL JURY’S STRUCTURAL ROLE IN AMERICAN
GOVERNMENT
Given the civil jury’s political importance, it is disturbing that the
erosion of the civil jury is happening with little attention or
comment. The Seventh Amendment right to a civil jury is being so
quietly relinquished. We are not, as a nation, simply waiving our
individual right to a jury; we are slowly losing a key element of our
system of government. The legal academy and the bar have
particular standing to explain the importance of the civil jury as
both an element of our system of government and as an individual
right. We must also demand action from our courts and from
Congress.
181. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 5 (“The House of Representatives ... shall have the sole
Power of Impeachment.”); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6 (“The Senate shall have the sole Power
to try all Impeachments.”). There have been sixteen full impeachment trials in the Senate,
resulting in eight convictions. ELIZABETH B. BAZAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 98-186
IMPEACHMENT: AN OVERVIEW OF CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, PROCEDURE, AND PRACTICE 16
(2010).
182. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7. Presidents have exercised the veto power 1498 times. President
Obama has exercised the veto only twice. See Summary of Bills Vetoed, 1789-present, UNITED
STATES SENATE, http://www.senate.gov/reference/Legislation/Vetoes/vetoCounts.htm (last
visited Jan. 29, 2014).
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A. The Role of the Courts
The Supreme Court has a ready option for restoring the civil jury
and protecting its structural role in American government: over-
turning the decisions described above that have put corporate
interests above the civil jury.183 The following affirmative steps
would also restore the civil jury’s structural role in American
government.
1. Incorporation of the Seventh Amendment
The civil jury is a feature of most state court systems. It remains
exposed to attack, however, because the Supreme Court has not
incorporated the Seventh Amendment against the states.184 The case
for incorporation deserves detailed consideration that goes beyond
the scope of this Article,185 but it merits outlining here.
The Supreme Court has applied provisions of the Bill of Rights
against the states through the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due
Process Clause.186 Most recently, the Court applied this
“incorporation” doctrine to conclude that the Second Amendment
applies against the states.187 It concluded that the standard for
incorporation is whether the right is “fundamental to our scheme of
ordered liberty or ... deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and
tradition.”188 The Second Amendment right to self-defense met this
183. See supra Part II.B.
184. See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3035 n.13 (2010) (listing the rights
not fully incorporated against the states).
185. See, e.g., Kevin Christopher Newsom, Setting Incorporationism Straight: A
Reinterpretation of the Slaughter-House Cases, 109 YALE  L.J. 643, 729-730 (2000) (speculat-
ing as to why Justice Samuel Freeman Miller may have voted against incorporation of the
Seventh Amendment by noting that “given the original understanding of the Seventh
Amendment, the right to a civil jury simply does not lend itself to mechanical incorporation
against state governments” because it was a structural amendment not directly addressing
individual rights). But see Bryan H. Wildenthal, The Lost Compromise: Reassessing the Early
Understanding in Court and Congress on Incorporation of the Bill of Rights in the Fourteenth
Amendment, 61 OHIO ST. L.J. 1051, 1144-47 (2000) (arguing that both the original and Civil
War era understandings of the Seventh Amendment do not suggest it was viewed as “uniquely
unsusceptible to incorporation”).
186. See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961) (incorporating the Fourth
Amendment against the states through application of the exclusionary rule to state courts). 
187. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3026.
188. Id. at 3036 (plurality opinion) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted) (citing
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standard.189 As the Court noted, this decision left the Seventh
Amendment’s guarantee of access to a civil jury as one of the few
unincorporated provisions of the Bill of Rights.190 
The Seventh Amendment should be incorporated against the
states. The Supreme Court will be on firm doctrinal ground when it
does so. As demonstrated above, the right is “deeply rooted in this
Nation’s history and tradition.” It is also an established element of
the structure of our Nation’s government, and thus “fundamental to
our scheme of ordered liberty.” 
2. Affirmative Protections for the Civil Jury
Courts should also interpret the Seventh Amendment in a
manner that protects the civil jury right from encroachment. The
Supreme Court, for example, has recently shown great solicitude to
the Second Amendment.191 It should do the same with respect to the
Seventh Amendment. To achieve this goal, courts should consider
approaches taken in the context of other constitutional provisions.
3. Preventing “Chilling” of the Civil Jury Right
The First Amendment provides that “Congress shall make no law
... abridging the freedom of speech.”192 The Supreme Court has
interpreted this text to bar both pure prohibitions of speech and
otherwise unobjectionable rules that would “chill” the exercise of
free speech rights.193 Last year, for example, the Court struck down
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149
(1968)).
189. Id.
190. Id. at 3035 n.13 (citing Minneapolis & St. L. R.R. v. Bombolis, 241 U.S. 211 (1916))
(identifying the Sixth Amendment right to a unanimous jury verdict, the Third Amendment’s
protection against quartering of soldiers, the Fifth Amendment’s grand jury indictment
requirement, the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial in civil cases, and the Eighth
Amendment’s prohibition on excessive fines as the only provisions of the Bill of Rights not
fully incorporated against the States, and explaining that the Supreme Court decision against
incorporation substantially predates the current approach of selective incorporation).
191. See id. at 3026.
192. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
193. See, e.g., Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 487 (1965) (holding that a state
provision defining subversive organizations was unconstitutionally vague and uncertain,
creating a “chilling effect upon the exercise of [the] First Amendment” right of free expression
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a law that made it a criminal offense to lie about being the recipient
of combat medals.194 The Court reasoned that by raising the specter
of prosecutions for misstatements regarding medals, such a law
would chill truthful speech properly protected by the First
Amendment, and thus was invalid.195 
Courts could take an analogous approach with respect to laws
that burden the exercise of the civil jury right. First, courts could
look closely at laws that establish “loser pays” systems, allow liberal
pursuit of sanctions motions, or enable the opposing party to impose
pretrial costs through motion practice or discovery litigation. In
each instance, a court could conclude that the rule “chills” the
exercise of a constitutional right by allowing the opposing party to
create incentives to abdicate the civil jury right. Second, courts have
established interpretive rules to avoid constitutional questions.196
This logic should apply in the civil jury context. It bears considering,
for example, whether the Supreme Court would have so decided
Twombly and Iqbal, two cases in which it never so much as cited the
Seventh Amendment, had it sought to avoid burdening the exercise
of Seventh Amendment rights. The Court, for example, might have
given concern about loss of access to a jury equal consideration to
the expense of the discovery process.197 And the Court might have
seen its solution in improving the discovery process such that cases
move more readily to trial, rather than in having more cases
dismissed before a civil jury could hear them.
because of the possibility of even unsuccessful prosecution).
194. See United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2543 (2012) (plurality opinion).
195. Id. at 2548 (plurality opinion).
196. See, e.g., Hooper v. California, 155 U.S. 648, 657 (1895) (“The elementary rule is that
every reasonable construction must be resorted to, in order to save a statute from
unconstitutionality.”).
197. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 685 (2009) (“Litigation, though necessary to ensure
that officials comply with the law, exacts heavy costs in terms of efficiency and expenditure
of valuable time and resources that might otherwise be directed to the proper execution of the
work of the Government.”); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 558-59 (2007)
(internal citations omitted) (“[I]t is one thing to be cautious before dismissing an antitrust
complaint in advance of discovery, but quite another to forget that proceeding to antitrust
discovery can be expensive.”).
1276 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55:1241
4. Rules to Prevent Infringement of the Civil Jury Right
Courts could establish prophylactic rules to prevent infringement
of the civil jury right. This approach would follow that adopted in
the criminal law arena, where the Miranda doctrine serves to
prevent infringement of the Fifth Amendment rights to counsel and
against self-incrimination. In that context, the Supreme Court has
insisted that persons in police custody must be aware of their
constitutional rights—including the right to the assistance of
counsel—and can only waive them knowingly and voluntarily.198
The Supreme Court established the familiar Miranda rules to that
end, concluding that “[p]rocedural safeguards must be employed to
protect the privilege” against self-incrimination and that “fully
effective means” should be “adopted to notify the person of his right
of silence and to assure that the exercise of the right will be
scrupulously honored.”199 “Requiring Miranda warnings before
custodial interrogation,” the Court later explained, “provides
‘practical reinforcement’ for the Fifth Amendment right.”200 
The animating principle of the Miranda decision and its
progeny—that it is at times necessary to prevent violations of
constitutional rights rather than try to discern and remedy them
after the fact—applies equally in the context of the civil jury right.
In the criminal context, the Supreme Court realized that it would be
hard to discern whether an arrestee knew his constitutional rights
and knowingly waived them.201 The same is true in the context of
the civil jury right. It is far from certain that the average injured
individual knows he or she has a right to access a civil jury. In this
light, should the innumerable contract provisions that purport to be
waivers of the constitutional right to a jury be enforced? It is
uncertain, after all, how many Americans knowingly agreed to
surrender their civil jury right in the fine print that bedevils
wireless phone contracts, rental car agreements, and employee
contracts. And even if these waivers are knowing, it is another
question whether they are voluntary. Relinquishing access to the
198. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 475 (1966).
199. Id. at 478-79. 
200. New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 654 (1984) (quoting Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S.
433, 444 (1974)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
201. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 475.
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civil jury is not voluntary in any meaningful sense if the alternative
is not having a cell phone or not getting a job. To address this,
courts could adopt rules declining to enforce mandatory predispute
arbitration agreements. That and comparable rules would give
“practical reinforcement”202 to the Seventh Amendment civil jury
right and allow the jury to continue to play its intended political
function.
Each of these methods would help lift the Seventh Amendment
from “stepchild” status, and reflect a judicial solicitude equivalent
to that shown for other amendments.
B. The Role of Congress
Though unable to change constitutional doctrine, Congress can
act to protect the civil jury through the judicial confirmation process
and in legislation. 
1. Judicial Nominations and the Civil Jury Right
Nominees to the federal bench should have a proper understand-
ing of the civil jury. This understanding should reach beyond a
vague appreciation for jury service and a general willingness to
accept the judgments a jury reaches. Nominees also must under-
stand that the civil jury functions as a political institution in our
system of government, including as a check on the authority of
judges. Judicial nominees should not be confirmed to the bench
thinking that the civil jury is simply an appendage of the court that
needs to be managed and controlled.
To that end, I have raised the political significance of the civil
jury with recent judicial nominees, including now-Justices Sonia
Sotomayor and Elena Kagan. These interactions are never conclu-
sive. Judicial nominees are no more able or willing to make
commitments regarding the civil jury than on any other issue. These
discussions, nonetheless, can be productive. Justice Sotomayor, for
example, observed that jury service often leaves jurors “more deeply
202. See Tucker, 417 U.S. at 444.
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committed to the fundamental importance of their role as
citizens.”203 Justice Kagan likewise commented:
[W]e learn about the separation of powers system and how the
three branches of Government are designed to check each other.
But the Framers also had a very strong view that there was
another check in the system, and that check was the people and
that the institution that the people often functioned as part of
was the jury. And to the Framers, the jury was ... extremely
important.204
More recently, Justices Scalia and Breyer returned to the Senate
Judiciary Committee. I asked Justice Scalia whether he understood
the jury to be a political institution and “an important piece of our
governmental architecture.”205 He responded:
Absolutely [it] is, which is why it is guaranteed in the Bill of
Rights in criminal cases and, indeed, in all civil cases at common
law involving more than $20. The jury is a check on us. It is a
check on the judges. I think the Framers were not willing to
trust the judges to find the facts. Indeed, you know, at the
beginning, or when the Constitution was ratified, juries used to
find not only the facts but the law. And this was a way of
reducing the power of the judges to condemn somebody to prison.
So it absolutely is a structural guarantee of the Constitution.206
Justice Breyer likewise addressed the structural role of the jury,
observing that the jury provides for an exercise of “community
203. Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Hon. Sonia Sotomayor, to be an Associate
Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 111th Cong. 352 (2009) (statement of J. Sotomayor).
204. Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Elena Kagan, to be an Associate Justice
of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary,
111th Cong. 200 (2010) (statement of J. Kagan). Now-Justice Kagan further explained: “I
think, Senator Whitehouse, that the jury was an extremely important mechanism to the
Framers, and it was a mechanism designed to check other institutions of Government.” Id.
at 201.
205. See Considering the Role of Judges Under the Constitution of the United States:
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 38 (2011) (statement of Sen.
Whitehouse). 
206. Id. at 39 (statement of J. Scalia).
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power” which brings “an entire community into the legal process.”207
Summarizing their sentiments, Justice Scalia added: “I am a big fan
of the jury, and I think our Court is, too.”208 But perhaps the Court
is now an even bigger fan of corporations.
2. Legislation to Protect the Civil Jury Right
Congress also can protect the civil jury through legislation.
Unfortunately recent legislative efforts in this vein have not been
successful as corporate lobbies have vigorously fought against them.
Senator Franken and then-Senator Feingold, for example,
championed the Arbitration Fairness Act.209 The 2011 bill, which I
co-sponsored, would have prohibited the enforcement of mandatory
pre-dispute arbitration agreements in the employment, consumer,
franchise, or civil rights contexts.210 Senator Blumenthal’s Con-
sumer Mobile Fairness Act, which I also co-sponsored, applied the
same rule to mobile phone contracts.211 Each bill was referred to the
Senate Judiciary Committee and numerous hearings were held
under the leadership of Chairman Leahy.212 In the face of consistent
corporate opposition, however, these bills never passed the Commit-
tee.213
Legislation to restore notice pleading and to protect the availabil-
ity of class actions has met a similar lack of success. The Senate
Judiciary Committee held a hearing to consider the effect of the
Iqbal and Twombly decisions at which legal experts explained the
207. Id. (statement of J. Breyer).
208. Id. at 40 (statement of J. Scalia).
209. See Arbitration Act of 2011, S. 987, 112th Cong. (2011); Arbitration Act of 2009, S. 931,
111th Cong. (2009); Arbitration Fairness Act of 2007, S. 1782, 110th Cong. (2007).
210. S. 987 § 3.
211. See Consumer Mobile Fairness Act of 2011, S. 1652, 112th Cong. § 3 (2011).
212. See, e.g., Arbitration: Is It Fair When Forced?: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 112th Cong. 177 (2011) (discussing the Arbitration Fairness Act of 2011 and the
Consumer Mobile Fairness Act of 2011); S. 1782, The Arbitration Fairness Act of 2007:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th
Cong. 396 (2007).
213. See, e.g., Arbitration: Is It Fair When Forced?: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 112th Cong. 12-13, 22 (2011) (statement of Victor E. Schwartz, Esq. on behalf of
the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and the U.S. Chamber Institute for Legal Reform) (arguing
that mandatory predispute arbitration is acceptable because the consumer can choose
whether to sign the underlying contract).
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importance of notice pleading to our justice system and the conse-
quences of departing from it.214 John Payton, head of the NAACP
Legal Defense Fund, for example, testified that “[i]t is not an
overstatement to say that the key successes of civil rights litigation
in the last half century are due, in part, to the pleading standard set
forth in the Federal Rules and reinforced by the Court in its seminal
decision in Conley.”215 Numerous other statements, including from
a coalition of leading civil rights and civil justice organizations,
emphasized the need to return to notice pleading to restore injured
Americans’ day in court before the civil jury.216 Unfortunately,
however, corporate opposition was clear217 and neither of the two
versions of Senator Specter’s Notice Pleading Restoration Act
secured sufficient support to move through Committee.218 
I also have made repeated efforts to undo the harmful effects of
the Exxon v. Baker decision.219 As discussed above, the Exxon Court
believed that predictability for corporations was more important
than deterring misconduct, or honoring the tradition of the jury
assessing damages.220 My legislation would have undone the
Supreme Court’s lawmaking—that a one-to-one ratio of punitive
damages to compensatory damages was appropriate—and restored
discretion to the jury to award punitive damages without reference
to compensatory damages.221 The Senate Judiciary Committee
214. See Has the Supreme Court Limited Americans’ Access to Courts?: Hearing Before the
S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. (2009).
215. Id. at 258 (statement of John Payton, President and Director-Counsel, NAACP Legal
Defense and Education Fund, Inc.).
216. See, e.g., id. at 78-79 (arguing on behalf of the American Civil Liberties Union, the
Sierra Club, and thirty-four other civil justice organizations that Twombly and Iqbal
“unilaterally expanded” the pleading rules and calling for restoration of the pleading
standards “that have kept the courthouse doors open”).
217. See, e.g., Multi-Industry Letter to the Hon. Patrick Leahy, Chairman, Senate
Judiciary Comm., Opposing S. 1504, the “Notice Pleading Restoration Act of 2009” (Dec.
1, 2009), available at http://www.uschamber.com/issues/letters/2009/multi-industry-letter-
opposing-s-1504-notice-pleading-restoration-act-2009.
218. See, e.g., Notice Pleading Restoration Act of 2010, S. 4054, 110th Cong.
219. See supra notes 139-43 and accompanying text. Efforts have also been made to protect
the ability of injured Americans to present their case to a jury as a class. Senator Barbara
Mikulski, for example, has included civil justice protections in her longstanding efforts to win
wage equality for women. The Acts sought to provide access to class actions to plaintiffs in
paycheck equality lawsuits. See Paycheck Fairness Act, S. 3220, 112th Cong. § 3 (2012); 
Paycheck Fairness Act, S. 797, 112th Cong. § 3 (2011).
220. See supra Part II.F.
221. See The Maritime Liability Fairness Act, S. 592, 112th Cong. § 3 (2011); The Big Oil
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considered the legislation in a hearing while oil was spilling into the
Gulf of Mexico after the Deepwater Horizon tragedy.222 Nonetheless,
corporate opposition remained resolute.223 Once again, legislation to
bolster the civil jury right failed. 
The fight to strengthen the civil justice system has not been
entirely without success. The first bill that President Barack Obama
signed into law was the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act, which
extended the period during which an injured American can bring
suit for employment discrimination.224 Despite the challenges225 and
the rarity of such victories, they demonstrate that we need to keep
pressing the fight in Congress, and build better public awareness of
the history and importance of the civil jury. Winning more legisla-
tive battles will require mobilizing public opinion about the civil
jury so that it is understood properly as a political institution and
as a “preservative of ... liberty.”226 Legislation will be hard but
worthy work.
CONCLUSION
The American system of separated powers has proved remarkably
durable. One of the vital elements of this system is the civil jury.
Polluter Pays Act, S. 3345, 111th Cong. § 3 (2010). Both bills found that “district and appellate
courts have the authority under common law to reduce excessively large punitive awards,” so
the effect of the legislation would have been to eliminate the arbitrary ratio established by the
Supreme Court, not eliminate the ability of courts to provide any limit on the discretion of
juries regarding punitive damages. S. 592 § 2; S. 3345 § 2.
222. See The Risky Business of Big Oil: Have Recent Court Decisions and Liability Caps
Encouraged Irresponsible Corporate Behavior?:, Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 111th Cong. 1-3 (2010).
223. Industry opposition managed to block even the most reasonable measures supported
by President Obama and a majority in the Senate, such as a bill that would raise the liability
cap for damages from oil spills above the current $75 million level. Richard Simon & Margot
Roosevelt, Senate Effort to Raise Spill Liability Cap Stalls, L.A. TIMES, May 14, 2010, at AA5.
224. Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5, 6 (2009) (codified at 42
U.S.C. § 200e-5(e)(3)(A)) (providing that each instance of pay discrimination—for example,
each paycheck that reflected the discriminatory action—violated the law for the purpose of
calculating the limitations period).
225. Corporate Lobbies opposed the bill. See, e.g., Letter to Members of the United States
Senate from R. Bruce Josten, Opposing S. 181, the “Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act” (Jan. 14,
2009), available at http://www.uschamber.com/letter/letter-opposing-s-181-lilly-ledbetter-fair-
pay-act (opposing the bill and indicating that votes on the bill would be scored as part of the
Chamber’s legislative scorecard).
226. BLACKSTONE, supra note 10, at *381.
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Demanded by the founding generation as an essential preservative
of liberty, and with a rich history that reaches centuries back in
English legal history, the civil jury has a long legacy of protecting
liberty and enhancing self-government. The attacks on the civil jury
by corporations over the last forty years are a relatively recent
phenomenon when viewed in light of this history. Indeed, the
importance of the civil jury in our constitutional history, particu-
larly compared to corporations’ lack of similar constitutional
pedigree, should have been a central discussion in evaluating these
attacks on the civil jury. Any sincere belief in “originalism” as a
principle would surely have led to this analysis. Unfortunately,
however, these corporate attacks succeeded, diminishing the civil
jury’s significance as a political institution. This trend leads us
away from our founding principles. The civil jury remains an
institution to enable self-government, to facilitate the separation of
powers, to protect against encroachments of power, and to foster
civic engagement and education. It is indeed a mode of the sover-
eignty of the people. It must be protected and strengthened, not
abandoned.
